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Abstract
‘Creative accounting’ involves accountants in making accounting policy choices or
manipulating transactions in such a way as to give the impression in the accounts that
they prefer.  While regarded as unethical by most observers, a defence of creative
accounting can be based on the ability of the users of accounts to identify bias in
accounting policy choices and make appropriate adjustments.
In this paper we take the example of the Barcelona Football Club where the club
management made three key accounting policy choices that presented a favourable
position, and a supporters’ club presented an alternative report choosing three
alternative accounting policies that presented an unfavourable position.  We presented
each of these financial reports to one of two groups of Spanish bank loan offices, with
supporting notes making the impact of the accounting policy choices clear.  We found
that the more favourable set of accounts was significantly more likely to attract a positive
response to a loan request.
This result undermines the defence for creative accounting, based on the ability of users
to identify manipulation.
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1. Introduction
Accountants can use their knowledge of accounting rules to manipulate the figures
reported in the accounts of a business.  This process has come to be commonly referred
to as ‘creative accounting’, particularly in the UK, (see for example Griffiths 1986,
Jameson 1988, Naser 1993), or also, particularly in the USA, as ‘earnings management’
(see for example Merchant and Rockness 1994, Fischer & Rosenzweig 1995).  The
former term has been taken up in Spain, as ‘contabilidad creativa’ (see for example Amat
& Blake 1996, Lainez & Callao 1999).
In this paper we review the literature on the nature of ‘creative accounting’ and consider
the evidence on the experience of creative accounting in Spain.  We then discuss the
ethics of creative accounting, identifying as a key element in the debate the issue as to
whether creative accounting affects the decisions made by users of accounts.  Finally,
we consider an example in Spain of a dispute as to the appropriate choice of accounting
policies in the case of the Barcelona Football Club (FCB), and report on the response of
Spanish bank loan officers to the accounts of a loan applicant using the most favourable
accounting policies in the FCB case, and compare these to the response of Spanish
bank loan officers to a loan applicant using the least favourable accounting policies in
the FCB case.5
2. The nature of creative accounting
Four books in the UK, each written from a different perspective, have considered the
creative accounting issue:
Griffiths (1986) writing from the perspective of a business journalist, observes:
"Every company in the country is fiddling its profits.  Every set of published
accounts is based on books which have been gently cooked or completely
roasted.  The figures which are fed twice a year to the investing public have all
been changed in order to protect the guilty.  It is the biggest con trick since the
Trojan horse ...  In fact this deception is all in perfectly good taste.  It is totally
legitimate.  It is creative accounting". (p1)
Jameson (1988) writing from the perspective of the accountant, argues:
"The accounting process consists of dealing with many matters of judgement and
of resolving conflicts between competing approaches to the presentation of the
results of financial events and transactions (p7) ... this flexibility provides
opportunities for manipulation, deceit and misrepresentation.  These activities -
practised by the less scrupulous elements of the accounting profession - have
come to be known as 'creative accounting' (p8).
Smith (1992) reports on his experience as an investment analyst:
"We felt that much of the apparent growth in profiles which had occurred in the
1980's was the result of accounting sleight of hand rather than genuine economic
growth, and we set out to expose the main techniques involved, and to give live
examples of companies using those techniques".  (p4)
Naser (1993) presenting an academic’s view, offers a definition:
"Creative accounting is the transformation of financial accounting figures from
what they actually are to what preparers desire by taking advantage of the
existing rules and/or ignoring some or all of them" (p. 2)6
Some common themes run through these books:
Creative accounting involves ‘fiddling’ and ‘figures which have been changed’ (Griffiths)
to achieve ‘misrepresentation’ (Jameson) by ‘sleight of hand’ (Smith) to transform figures
from ‘what they actually are’ (Naser).  Explicit in Naser, and implicitly in the other three
accounts, is that there is some underlying objective truth and that creative accounting
departs from this.  Creative accounting is seen as widespread in the UK.  Naser
perceives the accounting system in Anglo-Saxon countries as particularly prone to such
manipulation because of the freedom of choice it permits, observing “The freedom of
choice provided by Anglo-Saxon accounting system could be abused ...”  (p.1).  Similarly
Waller (1990), addressing the problem of ‘creative accounting’ in the UK, advocates a
move to the more legal and prescriptive continental tradition as a solution.  Finally all
four authors perceive creative accounting as a disreputable practice, using terms such
as ‘fiddling’, ‘deceit’ and ‘taking advantage’.
The relative extent of creative accounting in the UK and in a continental European
country, Spain, is considered in the following section.  The ethical debate over creative
accounting is then reviewed.  We turn now, therefore, to the first question, being whether
there is some underlying objective accounting truth from which ‘creative accounting’ can
be deemed to depart.
Blake et al (1998) argue that there are four ways in which creative accounting may arise.
Firstly by the exercise of choice between permitted alternative accounting policies.  An
example would be in choosing whether to write off or capitalise research and
development costs.  Secondly by applying bias in the making of accounting estimates.
An example would be in the estimation of asset life for depreciation purposes.  Thirdly by
structuring transactions in such a way as to manipulate the accounts.  For example, in a
sale and leaseback arrangement the sale proceeds of an asset might be artificially
depressed or boosted with an equivalent adjustment to related rental payments.  Finally
by timing genuine transactions so as to manipulate the accounts.  For example, if an
investment with a historic cost of £1 million has a market value of £3 million, then
managers can time realisation to boost profits in the year of their choice.7
The first two of these might be termed ‘accounting manipulation’.  The problem of
defining an accounting policy choice as ‘manipulative’, and therefore ‘creative’ is that
where accounting regulation permits such choice then this is likely to reflect legitimate
debate over the issue concerned.  As an example, Robson (1994) points out that in the
mid 1970’s the UK Sandilands report on inflation accounting identified twenty possible
combinations of net asset and capital maintenance that could define profit.  Thus it is not
the individual policy choice in itself that constitutes ‘manipulation’ but the intention
behind it.  One way to identify a tendency towards a ‘creative’ bias in company accounts
is to consider the impact of its overall selection of accounting policies.  Thus, Smith
(1992) identifies twelve accounting policy choices each of which tends to put company
performance in a favourable light.  He observes:
“inclusion in the list of any particular technique does not automatically mean
that the company is indulging in creative accounting” (p184)
However, where a number of such accounting approaches arise in one company’s
accounts then the suspicion of manipulation grows.
3. The Spanish context
Spain only acquired a set of accounting rules for all companies with the Plan General de
Contabilidad (PGC - General Accounting Plan) of 1973.  In the period 1988 - 1990, a
series of laws introduced an audit requirement, prescribed consolidated accounts, and
culminated in full implementation of the EU directives on accounting and auditing in the
PGC of 1990.  Concerns that, within this framework, Spanish companies are engaging in
creative accounting have been expressed by a range of observers (see Giner 1992,
Rojo 1993, Rodriquez Molinuevo 1996, Amat et al 1997, Rodriquez-Vilarino 1998, Lainez
& Callao 1999).
We have seen above that some observers in the UK have perceived the Anglo-Saxon
tradition of flexibility in accounting policy choice as giving rise to more scope for creative
accounting than the continental European tradition.  Amat and Blake (1996) report on a
survey of Spanish auditors’ views on creative accounting, and compare this with a
similar survey in the UK  reported by Naser (1993).  Table 1 compares two key8
responses.  It is striking that in both countries both the importance and the legitimacy of
creative accounting appear to be viewed similarly.
Table 1. Summary of results on auditor’s attitudes towards creative accounting
Question Agree or Strongly Agree
Spain United Kingdom
Do you consider the use of creative
accounting to be a serious problem?
65.5% 64.3%
Do you consider that the use of creative
accounting is a legitimate business tool?
31% 35.7%
4. The ethics of creative accounting
We have seen above that all four UK commentators saw creative accounting as
inherently disreputable.  Similarly in the USA, the then senior partner in Price
Waterhouse, termed such an approach ‘fraudulent’ (Conner 1986, p78).  In Australia,
Leung and Cooper (1995) report that in a survey of 1500 accountants the three most
frequently cited ethical problems were as shown in table 2.  It is striking that creative
accounting ranks above tax evasion as an issue.
Table 2: Three most frequently cited ethical problems
% of respondents
Conflict of interest 51.9 %
Client proposal to manipulate accounts 50.1 %
Client proposal for tax evasion 46.8 %
Source:  Leung and Cooper (1995)
Two surveys of attitudes to creative accounting in the USA both highlighted contrasting
attitudes to ‘accounting manipulation’ and ‘transaction manipulation’.  Fischer and
Rosenzeig (1995) found that accounting and MBA students were more critical than
accounting practitioners of manipulated transactions, whereas accounting practitioners
were more critical than students of abuse of accounting rules.  Similarly Merchant and
Rockness (1994) found that, when presented with scenarios of creative accounting,9
accountants were more critical of accounting manipulation than transaction manipulation.
Merchant and Rockness also found a difference in accountants’ attitudes to creative
accounting depending on the motivation of management.  Creative accounting based on
explicitly motives of self interest attracted more disapproval than where the motivation
was to promote the company.
A contrasting view is put forward by Revsine (1991).  He offers a discussion of the
‘selective financial misrepresentation hypothesis’ which can be seen as offering some
defence for the practice of ‘creative accounting’, at lease in the private sector, drawing
heavily on the literature on agency theory and positive accounting theory.  He considers
the problem in relation to both managers and shareholders and argues that each can
draw benefits from ‘loose’ accounting standards that provide managers with latitude in
timing the reporting of income.
Revsine discusses the benefits to managers in being able to manipulate income between
years so as to maximise their bonus entitlements, as discussed above.  He argues that:
“It is reasonable to presume that those who negotiate managers’ employment
contracts anticipate such opportunistic behaviour and reduce the compensation
package accordingly ... since they (managers) have already been ‘charged’ for
the opportunistic actions they must now engage in them in order to achieve the
benefits they ‘paid’ for.”(p. 18)
Shareholders also benefit from the fact that managers can manipulate reported earnings
to ‘smooth’ income since this may decrease the apparent volatility of earnings and so
increase the value of their shares.  Other management action, such as avoiding default
on loan agreements, can also benefit shareholders.
At the heart of Revsine’s analysis are the implicit views that:
•  the prime role of accounting is as a mechanism for monitoring contracts between
managers and other groups providing finance;
•  market mechanisms will operate efficiently, identifying the prospect of accounting
manipulation and reflecting this appropriately in pricing and contracting decisions.10
While the second point is supported in relation to shareholders by the literature on
market efficiency (for summaries of this see for example Watts & Zimmerman, 1986)
there is little research on whether other user groups may be misled by accounting
manipulation.  There has been research on the response of bank loan officers to
accounts where difference accounting policies in respect of one specific area of choice
have been presented.  These cover two area:
1. The choice between treating a long term lease agreement in accordance with its
commercial substance, so that the leased asset is shown as an asset and the
related obligation to make lease payments is shown as a liability, or showing the
transaction in accordance with its legal form, so that only the rental payments are
disclosed as an expense.  Studies in the USA (Abdel-Khalik et al 1981),
Singapore (Wilkins and Zimmer 1983), and Spain (Blake et al 1995), all indicate
that the former accounting policy choice, which portrays a company as having
higher borrowings, leads to that company being viewed less favourably by bank
loan officers.
2. The choice between treating development costs and an asset, to be amortised
against future income from the related project, and as an expense in the year
they are incurred.  In the USA, McGee (1984) reports that bank loan officers
clearly took a more favourable view of company accounts where the first policy
was adopted.
Thus we have evidence from four studies in three countries that a key user group are
influenced in their assessment of financial statements by the accounting policy choices
made in one specific area, and therefore are vulnerable to having their decisions
affected by the accounting policy choice made in company accounts.  In this study we
seek to extend this insight by considering whether a collection of accounting policy
choices which together may bias an entity’s reported performance in a favourable, or
alternatively an unfavourable, direction, have a similar impact on the decision making of
bank loan officers.  To construct a realistic case to test this issue we have taken the first
instance in Spain where there has been a public debate over the collective impact of a
collection of accounting policy choices, the case of the Barcelona Football Club.11
5. The Barcelona Football Club Case
In July 1998, the annual accounts of the Barcelona Football Club (FCB) were published,
with a clean audit report from the joint auditors, KPMG and Price Waterhouse Coopers.
In December 1998, a supporters club, Elefant Blau (EB), commissioned an alternative
financial report from two local auditing firms and a local consulting firm.  The FCB
accounts showed a net profit of 492 million pesetas, compared with the EB version
which showed a net loss of 3720 million pesetas.  The difference was attributable to
three differences in accounting policies:
1. The accounting treatment of costs of extending or renewing player contracts.
The FCB accounts, for the first time, treated these as assets to be capitalised
and then amortised over future years.  The EB version wrote these costs off
immediately in the profit and loss account, as had been done in the FCB
accounts in previous years.
2. FCB was subject to a tax penalty of 3512 million pesetas.  Having taken advice
that the club was likely to be relieved of this penalty on appeal, the club made no
provision for this liability in the accounts.  EB’s version made such a provision.
3. FCB had treated 3229 million pesetas of transfer fees received as ordinary
income.  EB also treated this as income, but as an extraordinary item.
Thus in each case where a permitted accounting policy choice could be made FCB
chose the most favourable and EB the least favourable option.  We do not attempt here
to evaluate which choice had more validity in each case.  It could be argued that both
parties, in consistently showing a bias in one direction, were equally prone to ‘creative
accounting’.
Two summarised versions of the FCB accounts were prepared, one on the basis on the
FCB chosen accounting policies and one on the basis of the EB chosen accounting
policies.  Full disclosure was made for each of the three accounting policy choices.  A
questionnaire attached to the accounts asked:
1. Would the respondent give a short term loan of 200 million pesetas to the enterprise?12
2. If so, at what interest rate?
3. Would the respondent give a five year loan of 400 million pesetas to the enterprise?
4.  If so, at what interest rate?
The questionnaire was given to Spanish bank loan officers attending management
development courses at three business schools in Barcelona, Zaragoza and Madrid.  In
each case the FCB version was given to half the class and the EB version to the other
half.  Each version was given out in blocks so as to eliminate the risk of participants
seeing both versions, and so being influenced in their choice.  Each population has been
analysed for gender, age and length of experience, and has an equivalent spread of
these factors.
Our hypothesis is that if creative accounting does influence the judgement of bank loan
officers then in each case this will be reflected in the more favourable assessment of the
FCB version of the accounts than of the EB version.  The results, as summarised in
table 3, support the hypothesis.  In relation to the short term loan, the results is
significant at a confidence level of 95%, and in the case of the long term loan at a
confidence level of 99%.13
Table 3: Summary of results
FCB Accounts EB Accounts
Number % Number %
YES 30 71 17 42
NO 12 29 23 58 Would you give the
enterprise a short term loan
of 200 million pesetas? TOTAL 42 100 40 100
PREFERENTIAL 13 43 2 12
NORMAL 15 50 12 71
ABOVE NORMAL 2 7 3 17 If yes, at what interest rate?
TOTAL 30 100 17 100
YES 29 69 12 30
NO 13 31 29 70 Would you give the
enterprise a 5 year loan of
400 million pesetas? TOTAL 42 100 40 100
PREFERENTIAL 9 31 5 42
NORMAL 15 52 5 42
ABOVE NORMAL 5 17 2 16 If yes, at what interest rate?
TOTAL 29 100 12 100
6. Conclusion
We have seen that ‘creative accounting’ has been seen as primarily an ‘Anglo American’
problem, but has caused growing concern in Spain, and is widely perceived as ethically
undesirable, but has been defended on the grounds that users will both expect it to arise
and be capable of identifying it.
We have taken a Spanish case where, on a combination of three accounting policy
choices, a strongly contrasting view can emerge between a favourable and an
unfavourable view of an entity’s performance.  Presenting these two different views to
Spanish bank loan officers we have found that in loan making decisions a choice of
favourable accounting policies does lead to a more favourable assessment of an entity’s14
financial capacity, even though the alternative unfavourable view is clearly identifiable
from brief notes to the accounts.  Our findings are consistent with earlier research in
other countries which indicates that accounting policy choice in one individual area of
accounting policy choice can bias the decision making of bank loan officers.
Our study, therefore, adds to the evidence that for one key user group, at least, bias in
accounting policy choice does have an impact on user decision.  We would argue that
this offers some challenge to Revsine’s defence of ‘earnings management’.
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